Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Cynthia Driver v. Utah Department of Health,
Division of Health Care Financing : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jean P. Hendrickson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Michael E. Bulson; Attorney for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Cynthia Driver v. Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing, No. 20001072 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3029

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CYNTHIA DRIVER,
*

Petitioner

Case No. 20001072-CA

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

*

Category No. 14

Respondent
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is a petition for review of a final agency order issued
by the Utah Department of Health, Division of HEALTH CARE
Financing on October 4, 2000, finding Petitioner ineligible for
coverage of medical bills under the Utah Medical Assistance
Program.

Jean P. Hendrickson # 4986
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
P.O. Box 140835
515 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835

Michael E. Bulson #0486
Attorney for Petitioner
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
893-24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

FILED
APR 1 6 2001
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TABT.F. OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

CASES CITED

iii

RULES AND REGULATIONS CITED

iii

STATUTES CITED

iv

CONSTITUTION SECTIONS CITED

iv

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

A.

Nature Of The Case

5

B.

Course Of The Proceedings

5

C.

Disposition At Trial Court Or Agency

6

D.

Relevant Facts With Citations To The Record

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

8

ARGUMENT

9

A.
The Services Provided Driver Should Have Been Covered
According To The UMAP Statute And Rules

9

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

By Excluding Coverage For Emergency Services Involving A

Psychiatric Condition DHCF Exceeded Its Authority To Implement

The UMAP Statute

14

C.
The UMAP Statute As Applied In This Case Is
Unconstitutional

16

CONCLUSION

22

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

23

ADDENDUM

24

1.

Final Agency Order, (undated) mailed October 4, 2 000;

2.

Request for Reconsideration, dated October 19, 2000;

3.

Denial of Request for Reconsideration, dated November
14, 2000;

4.

Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10;

5.

Utah Administrative Code R420-1 et. seq.

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 616 P.2d 1250, 1255
(Utah 1980)

16

First National Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization,
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)

2

King v. Industrial ConrnVn, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285
(Utah App. 1993)

1

McCorvey y. Utah State Dept. Of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah
1993)

3

Nelson v. Betit, 937 P.2d 1298, 1303 (Utah App. 1997)

15

Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1999) ..

2

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Twin Falls County,
732 P.2d 278 (Idaho 1987)
14,15,21
Savage Tndns. v. Tax CoTrmVn., 811 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1991) ... 2
State Dept. Of T.ahor v. Univ. Of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575, 579
(Alaska 1983)

14

Utah Public Employees Ass'n. v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273
(Utah 1980)

17

Zissi v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852-53 & n. 2 (Utah 1992) .. 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS CITED
Utah Administrative Code R420-1-5

4,10

Utah Administrative Code R420-1-6

5

Utah Administrative Code R420-1-2(9)

9

Utah Administrative Code R420-l-2(10)

11

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Administrative Code R420-1-2(7)

10

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10

1,3,9, 22

Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-16 (1988)

1

Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)

2

Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)

2

Utah Code Annot. § 78-2-3(2)(a)(1996)

1

CONSTITUTION SECTIONS CITED
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1,4, 16

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for review of a final agency order
issued by the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health
Care Financing (DHCF) on October 4, 2000.

Record (hereinafter

referred to as "R") at 38. The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annot. §§ 63-46b-16 (1988)
and 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the emergency services provided Petitioner

Cynthia Driver (hereinafter "Driver") were covered under the
statute creating the Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP),
Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10, and the DHCF rules which
implement the statute?
2.

Whether DHCF exceeded its authority under the UMAP

statute by adopting a rule which excludes coverage for selfinflicted injuries caused by a psychiatric condition?
3.

Whether DHCF violated Article I, Section 24 of the

Utah Constitution by denying Driver UMAP medical coverage.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The final agency order may be reversed, if Driver was
substantially prejudiced by a determination of fact, made or
implied by DHCF, that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); King v. Industrial Comm'n,
850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993).

Substantial evidence is

defined as "that which a reasonable person 'might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id.

When reviewing the

substantiality of the evidence, the reviewing court must
consider both the evidence supporting the agency's findings
and the evidence negating these findings.

First Nat'l Bank of

Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165
(Utah 1990) .
The final agency order may also be overturned, if Driver
was substantially prejudiced by DHCF's erroneous
interpretation or application of the law.
63-46b-16(4)(d).

Utah Code Annot. §

The correction of error standard applies to

agency decisions involving the interpretation or application
of general law and no deference is extended to such agency
rulings.

Zissi v. Tax Comm'n., 842 P.2d 848, 852-53 & n. 2

(Utah 1992); Savage Indus, v. Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664, 669
(Utah 1991).

The proper interpretation of a statute is a

question of law.

Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201

(Utah App 1999).

A presumption of constitutionality applies

to legislative acts and, unless a statute impinges on a
fundamental right, the legislation's opponent has the burden
of proving unconstitutionality.

McCorvey v, Utah State Dept,
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Of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
1.
Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10 Utah Medical Assistance
Program
(1) The division shall develop a medical
assistance program, which shall be known as the
Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income
persons who are not eligible under the state plan
for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that
act.

(3) The department shall develop standards
and administer policies relating to eligibility
requirements, consistent with Subsection 26-183(6 J1, for participation in the program, and for
payment of medical claims for eligible persons.

(5) The department shall determine what
medically necessary care or services are covered
under the program, including duration of care, and
method of payment, which may be partial or in
full.
(6) The department shall not provide public
assistance for medical, hospital, or other medical
expenditures or medical services to otherwise
eligible persons where the purpose of the
assistance is for the performance of an abortion,
unless the life of the mother would be endangered
if an abortion were not performed.
(7) The department may establish rules to
1

Subsection 26-18-3(6) permits the department to exclude
from consideration one passenger vehicle and has no bearing on
this appeal.
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carry out the provisions of this section.
Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
Utah Administrative Code R420-1-5. Service Coverage
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is
limited to treatment of conditions that meet one
or more of the following criteria, unless
elsewhere excluded.
(a) an acute condition characterized by a
rapid onset requiring prompt medical attention.
UMAP shall consider a condition to be not acute
once it is medically established to have been in
existence for four months or more, regardless of
when the client began experiencing symptoms.
Recurring conditions are not acute.
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not
psychiatric;
....

(2) UMAP may cover the following medical
services:
(a) outpatient hospital services
(b) physician services
.....

(e) emergency transportation services for
both air and ground
....

(3) For all UMAP covered services, the
principal diagnosis at discharge from the hospital
is the reason for the care. UMAP may not consider
the other diagnoses when determining whether the
service is covered by UMAP.
(a) UMAP shall pay a minimal set triage fee
for emergency transportation, emergency room
physicians, and emergency room facility charges
for services that do not result in an inpatient
admission, if the diagnosis is a UMAP covered
medical condition, but the principal diagnosis at
discharge is psychiatric.
(b) The minimal set triage fee shall
constitute payment for the entire service. A
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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notation on the form MI-706 advises the provider
that he received authorization for only the
minimal set triage fee.
4.

Utah Administrative Code R420-1-6 Limitations and Excluded
Services
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP
include:
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug
addiction, alcohol addiction
•• • •

(2) Services that are not covered by UMAP
include:
(e) psychiatry, or any service provided to a
client while he is in a psychiatric facility,
wing, ward, or bed;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a DHCF decision denying UMAP

coverage to Driver, for the reason that her condition which
precipitated her need for care—attempted suicide—was caused
by a psychiatric condition—bipolar disorder.

Even though

Driver was not seeking treatment of her mental disorder, DHCF
determined that the cost of emergency transportation and
emergency room physician care needed to save her life could
not be covered under UMAP.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On April 21, 2000, Driver was denied UMAP coverage for

medical services necessary to save her life.

R-14.
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On May 5,

2000, Driver requested a hearing.

R-12.

On July 12, 2000, a

prehearing telephone conference was held before Hearing
Officer Bert Jansen.

R-8. A formal hearing was then

scheduled for August 30, 2000 at which Driver appeared and
testified.

On September 7, 2000, Hearing Officer Jansen

issued a Recommended Decision affirming DHCF's denial of UMAP
coverage.

R-43.

On October 4, 2000, a copy of the DHCF final

agency action adopting the recommended decision was mailed to
Driver.

R-45.

Driver sought reconsideration of the final

agency action (R-47), which was denied on November 14, 2000.
R-49.

On December 8, 2000, Driver filed her petition for

review with this court. R-57.
C.

Disposition in the Agency
DHCF denied UMAP coverage initially and after a formal

hearing.

Reconsideration of the final agency action was also

denied.
D.

Statement of the Facts
At the time emergency services were provided to Driver,

she was 36 years old, married and a resident of Ogden. R-20.
She reported being in mental health treatment at Weber Human
Services since September 1998. R-28.

Driver has been

diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder with depressive and
manic symptomatology.

R-22.

She has probable obsessive

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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compulsive disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia and
dysthymic disorder.

R-22.

She has been treated with

amitriptyline, Prozac, Ativan, Wellbutrin, Trazadone, Librium
and Lithobid.

R-20-21.

Driver reported a "very disruptive

childhood" involving physical and mental abuse. R-21.
Driver attempted suicide by overdosing at age 15 and
twice at age 18. R-20.
hospitalizations.

R-20.

She has had approximately eight prior
On January 29, 2000, Driver

attempted suicide by consuming 60 Lithobid and 25-30 Claritin
tablets.

R-20.

Driver testified that her suicide attempt was

caused by a build up of problems but that being denied Social
Security disability, had "tipped the iceberg" and prompted her
overdose.

R-75-2 9. Driver was transported to McKay Dee

hospital by ambulance and treated in the emergency room by Dr.
Dennis Smith.

R-34.

Driver was also administered an

electrocardiogram in the emergency room.

T-30.

At the

emergency room, Driver was "charcoaled and lavaged" with whole
pills suctioned up. R-20.
Although Driver was admitted to McKay Dee Hospital, the
claims denied by UMAP pertain only to the emergency
procedures.

The claims include a bill from Ogden Fire and

Ambulance in the amount of $519.15 and a bill from Wasatch
Emergency Physicians in the amount of $240.00. R-15-17.
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Both

bills were denied coverage by UMAP.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The emergency services provided Draper to save her life
should have been covered, since both the UMAP statute and the
administrative rules adopted by DHCF contemplate coverage for
life-threatening conditions.

DHCF failed to follow its own

rules in not obtaining the best information regarding the main
medical problem for which coverage was sought.

The main

medical problem was an attempted suicide not psychotherapy or
medication for a psychiatric condition.
The Legislature delegated certain authority to DHCF under
the UMAP statute to develop rules regarding medically
necessary services that would be covered.

DHCF defined

"medically necessary" as essentially meaning life-threatening
conditions.

DHCF's adoption of a rule which excludes coverage

for a life-threatening suicide attempt, simply because it has
a psychiatric basis, exceeds its delegated authority.
The procedure DHCF follows in determining whether a selfinflicted injury will be covered by UMAP is inherently
arbitrary.

Coverage depends on a discharge diagnosis by a

physician, who is uninformed as to the UMAP rules, and results
in coverage in some self-inflicted injury cases but not in
others.

The application of the statute violates the uniform
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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operation of the laws provision of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Services Provided Driver Should Have Been Covered
According To The UMAP Statute and Rules
The UMAP program was developed to provide medical care

for low-income persons not covered by Medicaid or Medicare.
Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10.

Driver satisfies those criteria,

since she was not eligible for either of these programs on
January 29, 2000.

The statute creating UMAP does not define

what coverage should be provided.

Instead, it leaves to the

Department of Health to determine what care and services are
"medically necessary" and, therefore, covered under the
program.

Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10(5).

This directive has

been implemented by the Department of Health and DHCF through
Administrative Rule 420-1-2(9) which defines medically
necessary as follows:
'Medically necessary' means reasonably
calculated to prevent, diagnose or cure
conditions that endanger life, cause
suffering and pain, cause physical deformity
or malfunction, or threaten to cause a
handicap, and there is no other equally
effective course of treatment available or
suitable for the client requesting the
service that is more conservative or less
costly. (Emphasis added)
The use of the phrase "conditions that endanger life"
demonstrates the Department's well-established commitment to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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providing services for conditions that are "life-threatening,"
a term defined as follows:
'Life-threatening condition' means a medical
condition which, if not immediately treated,
poses an imminent danger to life or will
result in permanent disability. ...
Administrative Rule R420-l-2(7)
Neither the statute nor the definition of "medically
necessary" care contains any limitation based on a mental
impairment.

On their face, the statute and definitions direct

that Driver be covered by UMAP, since she was suffering from a
condition that endangered her life—attempted suicide.

DHCF

bases its denial of services, not on the statute and
definition of medically necessary, but on subsequent language
in the rules which (1) excludes coverage for life-threatening
conditions when the principal diagnosis is "psychiatric" and
(2) narrows the principal diagnosis to the "diagnosis at
discharge from the hospital."

Utah Administrative Rule R420-

1-5(1)(b) and (3).
Driver's case demonstrates the absurd result the rules
produce.

Driver was admitted to the emergency room at McKay

with a diagnosis of "attempted suicide" by overdose.

The

services provided were not to treat a mental condition, which
might typically involve the use of psychotropic medications
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and psychotherapy.

Rather, the services were for the sole

purpose of treating a life-threatening condition.

Had Driver

been released from the emergency room, without being admitted
to the inpatient unit, the emergency services arguably would
have been covered.

However, because she was admitted to the

inpatient unit, and because a doctor after a brief evaluation
entered a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, her principal
diagnosis shifted from a covered life-threatening condition to
an uncovered psychiatric condition.
To reach this absurd result, DHCF had to ignore the
definition of "Principal diagnosis at discharge."

Had this

rule been followed, coverage would have resulted.

The rule

provides:
'Principal diagnosis at discharge' means the
main medical problem, based on the best
information available for review by UMAP.
Utah Administrative Code R420-1-2(10).

DHCF did not carry out

its responsibility of obtaining the best information available
regarding the main medical problem that precipitated Driver's
need for care.

Driver was not taken to the McKay Dee ER to

obtain therapy and medication for her bipolar disorder.

Her

stomach was not pumped as a means of treating her mental
impairment.

She was not even placed in the inpatient unit as

a means of treating her "psychiatric" condition.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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She was

placed there to stabilize a life-threatening condition—
attempted suicide.

Any treatment for her psychiatric

condition was purely incidental.
The representative who testified for DHCF at Driver's
hearing acknowledged that DHCF does nothing in cases of this
type to obtain the best information available regarding the
main medical problem.

Mr. Evans testified that a patient

admitted for slashing her wrists might receive coverage, if
the ER physician dictated that wrist laceration was the
primary diagnosis.

R-75-9-10. Mr. Evans admitted that a

mental condition would probably be the cause of a selfinflicted wrist laceration.

But as the following excerpt from

the hearing transcript shows, DHCF does not try to determine
the main medical problem:
Q: But in your experience, in most cases of
attempted suicide, isn't it because of
depression or a mental condition?
A: I would say probably some of it would be
depression, yeah.
Q: —what other precipitating condition
might there be for someone to try and take
their life, in whatever fashion?
A: I don't know.
Q: You don't know?
A: No.
Q: So, the principal diagnosis really depends
upon what the physician decides to put down,
is that correct?
A: Exactly, yes.
Q: And do you ever go in and make further
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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inquiry about that?
A: No.
Q: Should the UMAP case manager do that?
A: No. No, our policy's specific, it says we
go by the discharge—the primary discharge
diagnosis.
Q: In this case, isn't it possible that had
further inquiry been made, the principal
•diagnosis might have been attempted suicide
through overdose?
A: Well, I guess the point I need to make
here is we are not in a position to question
the physician's diagnosis. ... I'm not a
medical person and neither are any of my
staff— ... and we do not have the option to
go back to the doctor and say, should you
have diagnosed this as something else?
That's not an option for us.
R-75-9-12.
The DHCF representative was wrong under the rules in
concluding that he could not go back to the doctor and clarify
the diagnosis.

Indeed, the rules direct UMAP officials to

obtain the best information available on the main medical
problem.

DHCF was not justified in blindly accepting the

diagnosis made by the ER physician that Driver suffers from
bipolar disorder.

She does have that condition.

But it was

not the main medical problem for which she was treated in the
McKay Dee ER.

Had DHCF made further inquiry, and explained to

the ER physician the purpose for its inquiry, it seems highly
likely the physician would have said that the main medical
problem for which services were provided was an attempted
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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suicide.

The fact that it was caused by an overdose and not

by a sharp instrument is irrelevant.
B.

By Excluding Coverage For Emergency Services Involving A
Psychiatric Condition DHCF Exceeded Its Authority To
Implement The UMAP Statute
When a statute delegates authority to an administrative

agency without expressly defining the extent of that
authority, it may be implied from the general policy and
purpose underlying the statute.

State Dept. Qf Labor v. Univ.

Of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575, 579 (Alaska 1983).

As discussed

above, the Legislature's declared purpose in creating UMAP was
to provide limited coverage to persons who did not qualify for
Medicaid or Medicare.

DHCF implemented that purpose by

defining medically necessary as essentially referring to acute
and life-threatening conditions.

However, DHCF exceeded its

authority by, in effect, legislating that emergency room
services for an attempted suicide would not be considered
medically necessary, because the suicide was caused by a
psychiatric condition.
The one court which has considered whether a medical
indigent program must cover self-inflicted injuries is St,
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Twin Falls County, 732
P.2d 278 (Idaho 1987).

In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court

considered the case of a man who applied for, and was denied,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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medical indigency assistance from the county after an
unsuccessful suicide attempt.

The Idaho Court affirmed a

district court decision reversing the county, and adopted the
holding that 'there is no express or implied exception to the
medical indigency law for self-inflicted injuries.'
279.

Id., at

The Idaho medical indigency statute defined "medically

indigent" as meaning "any person who is in need of
hospitalization and who ... does not have income and other
resources available to him from whatever source which shall be
sufficient to enable the person to pay for necessary medical
services."

Id., at 279.

The Court held that the statute

plainly included "any person in need of hospitalization" and
made no exclusion of persons whose need arose from a selfinflicted injury.

Id., at 280.

The Idaho Court in St, Alphonsus held that the statute
unambiguously included indigents suffering from a selfinflicted injury.

It observed that when a statute is not

ambiguous, it is the duty of the court to follow it. St,
Alphonsus v. Twin Falls County, 732 P.2d at 280.

The Utah

statute in this case is equally clear that indigent persons
not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare and in need of medically
necessary care are to be covered by UMAP.

Even though DHCF is

given some authority to interpret the statute, it cannot do so
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in a way that produces an unreasonable result.
Betit, 937 P.2d 1298, 1307 (Utah App. 1997).

Nelson v.

By interpreting

the UMAP statute to exclude a life-threatening suicide
attempt, simply because the claimant is later diagnosed with a
mental impairment, produces an unreasonable result which
should not be allowed by the court.

C.

The UMAP Statute As Applied In This Case Is
Unconstitutional
The Utah Constitution in Article I, Section 24 provides

that all laws of a general nature must be uniformly applied.
The UMAP statute establishes a medical assistance program for
low income Utah citizens who do not qualify for Medicaid or
Medicare.

DHCF, however, has applied that statute in a way

that is not uniform.

The rules promulgated by DCHF at issue

in this appeal result in an otherwise eligible person being
denied coverage, simply because of the arbitrary designation
of the person's diagnosis when released from a hospital.
There is a general reluctance on the part of the
judiciary to declare a statute facially unconstitutional.
Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 616 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah
1980).

However, a statute which is facially constitutional

may be shown to be unconstitutional as applied.
That is the case in this appeal.

Id., at 1256.

Driver does not question the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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constitutionality of the UMAP statute itself; she challenges
its enforceability as applied by DHCF in her case.
Although the notion is compelling, the right to adequate
health care has not been held to be a fundamental right.
Therefore, strict scrutiny does not apply to the deprivation
of medical assistance Driver suffered.

Utah Public Employees

Ass'n. V, State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980).

Whether the

statute as applied is unconstitutional must, therefore, be
measured by the rational basis test.

Under that test, Driver

has the burden of showing that the application of the statute
is without any reasonable basis and is, therefore, arbitrary.
Xd., at 1274.
A review of the record in this case shows the UMAP rules
which resulted in a denial of Driver's medical coverage are an
arbitrary application of the statute.

In adopting the UMAP

statute, the Utah legislature intended that persons like
Driver who are ineligible for Medicaid or Medicare would
receive medical coverage, albeit limited.

DHCF has been given

by statute the authority to determine what medically necessary
care or services are to be covered and has established a
general rule that UMAP is available to cover acute and lifethreatening conditions.

Had Driver needed emergency

transportation and care as the result of an automobile
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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accident, there is no question she would have received
coverage.

To deny coverage for an equally acute and life-

threatening condition—attempted suicide—simply because the
claimant is later diagnosed as suffering from a mental
impairment is patently arbitrary.

The imminent threat to life

was just as real in Driver's case as it would have been had
she suffered critical injury in a car accident.
This arbitrariness is further exacerbated by the fact
that coverage turns on the primary diagnosis entered by a
physician on a discharge summary.

In this case there is no

dispute that Driver's admitting diagnosis at the emergency
room was attempted suicide.

Based on that diagnosis, Driver

received emergency room services, including the use of
charcoal and a stomach pumping.

Had Driver been discharged

after the emergency procedures removed the threat to her life,
the costs incurred would have been covered.

Instead, the

emergency room physician, in an apparent effort to stabilize
her condition, admitted her as an inpatient.
During the course of her inpatient stay, Driver was
examined by Dr. Dennis H. Smith who prepared a psychiatric
assessment and a discharge report which included the discharge
diagnosis: bipolar affective disorder NOS.

R-18.

However,

had Dr. Smith known of the UMAP rules, had UMAP properly
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advised him, or had Driver known of the limitation on
coverage, the discharge report might have included the
primary, admitting diagnosis of attempted suicide.

In his

hearing testimony, Cleve Evans, the representative for DHCF,
admitted the arbitrariness of this system.

When asked whether

he had seen similar cases covered by UMAP, Mr. Evans answered,
"If the principal diagnosis had nothing to do with a psych
condition, I have seen them cover it, yes."

R-75-9. Mr.

Evans testified that a patient admitted to the ER for a selfinflicted injury through wrist slashing, would likely receive
coverage, if the physician listed "wrist laceration" as the
principal and primary diagnosis.

R-75-9.

Even though a

psychiatric condition is arguably the impetus for the suicide
attempt, either by overdose or by wrist slashing, UMAP
coverage depends on the diagnosis entered by the attending
physician.
DHCF personnel make no effort to clarify whether the
discharge diagnosis is accurate.

Mr. Evans testified that the

accepted diagnosis is whatever the physician decides to put
down.

DHCF does not attempt to determine the actual main

medical problem.

R-75-11.

In responding to questions about

the coverage for emergency heart attack cases, the DHCF
representative's testimony revealed even further evidence of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lack of uniformity in applying the UMAP statute.

Coverage for

emergency care can turn on whether the patient is admitted to
the hospital.

Thus, an ER patient with signs of a heart

attack, but with a primary diagnosis of major depression who
was not admitted to the hospital, would probably receive
coverage under what is called a "triage fee." 2 R-75-16.
Moreover, Mr. Evans, who has applied the UMAP policies for ten
years (R-75-8) understood the policy as allowing coverage in
the case of a patient with chest pain and heart attack
symptoms which turned out to be caused by a panic disorder,
even though the primary diagnosis was for a psychiatric
condition.

R-75-17. Mr. Evans also agreed that the heart

attack/panic disorder case, for which coverage would be
allowed, was logically the same as Driver's case, where
coverage was not allowed . R-75-19.

However, the Director of

DHCF, Michael Deily, in denying reconsideration, denied that
UMAP services would be allowed in the hypothetical heart
attack/panic disorder case. R-50.
What, then, is a possible rational basis for the DHCF
policy which, as Driver contends, results in a nonuniform
2

A triage fee was not paid in Driver's case, apparently
because she was admitted to the hospital, although no bill for
inpatient services was included in the record. Had the triage
fee been allowed in Driver's case, the ambulance and emergency
room doctor bill would have been covered, at least partially.
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on

application of the UMAP statute?

It cannot be maintained that

the policy has a rational basis as a cost-saving measure,
because the Director of DHCF has specifically denied that the
limitation on coverage has anything to do with budget
constraints.

R-50.

In his denial of reconsideration, the

DHCF director stated,
Finally, Petitioner commented on recent
funding cuts to UMAP and seems to imply that
budgetary constraints may have played a roll
[sic] in the decision to deny Petitioner
coverage for her hospital treatment. ... As
determined in the final order, UMAP denied
coverage based on the hospital records
indicating a principal psychiatric condition.
UMAP has always been a program that is very
limited in its scope of coverage.
Speculating and implying that UMAP
inappropriately denied Petitioner coverage
based on budgetary concerns does not warrant
reconsideration of this matter.

If budgetary constraints are not the rational basis for
denying uniform application of the law, then perhaps the basis is
a rejection of self-inflicted injury cases.

However, as the

sister-state decision in St. Alphonsus v. Twin Falls County, 732
P.2d 278 (Idaho 1987) has shown, coverage for persons who suffer
self-inflicted injuries is an appropriate use of state medical
indigent funds.
The UMAP statute itself supports by analogy the argument
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that Driver's care should have been covered.

The UMAP statute

provides that no public assistance can be provided for the
performance of an abortion, "unless the life of the mother would
be endangered if an abortion were not performed."
Annot. § 26-18-10(6).

Utah Code

Implicit in this language is the

recognition that even prohibited services may be covered when the
life of the patient is threatened.

It is a reasonable extension

of that rule to say that Driver's life-threatening condition
should be covered, even though UMAP might not otherwise cover the
cost of services for treating a mental impairment.
In sum, there is no rational basis for excluding Driver from
coverage under the UMAP statute.

DHCF's application of the law

should be found to be arbitrary and in violation of the Utah
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Driver is one of the indigent persons intended by the
Legislature to receive coverage under UMAP.

Denying coverage for

her life-threatening suicide attempt was unreasonable and
unsupported by the evidence.

The court should reverse the final

agency decision and find her eligible.
DATED this

of April, 2001.

lichael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner
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State of Utah
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Governor

288 North 1460 West
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Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-3101
Telephone: (801 i 538-6406
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Executive Director
DIVISION OF HEALTH
CARE FINANCING

Michael J . D e i l y
Division Director

CYNTHIA DRIVER
Petitioner
FINAL AGENCY ORDER
Case No. 00-172-42

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD
LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS
SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576.
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department
of Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and
Providers."
I hereby adopt Recommended Decision No. 00-172-42 in its entirety.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Order is issued, you may file a
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care
Financing. Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested. The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review.
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for reconsideration is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds
upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order.
A copy of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested.

DATED this

day of October 2000
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BY: ' j i i^MM/ i
Michael Deily, Direc^oij/
Division of Health Oare F i n d i n g
UTAH DEPARTMNT OF HEALTH
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STATE OF UTAH
00O00
(

CYNTHIA DRIVER,
Petitioner,

(

vs.

RECOMMENDED DECISION
Case No.00-172-42

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,

(

Respondent.

Lambertus Jansen
Hearing Officer
(

Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Administrative Code (Utah Health Department)
and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l, et seq., Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, a formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on the
30th day of August, 2000, at the Cannon Health Building, 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake City,
Utah. The Petitioner, Cynthia Driver, appeared and was represented by Michael Bulson,
Attorney at Law, with Utah Legal Services. The Respondent was represented by Cleve Evans,
Program Manager for the Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP).
ISSUE
DID THE MEDICAL AGENCY (UMAP) CORRECTLY DENY PAYMENT FOR
SERVICES RECEIVED AT McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL BECAUSE (a) PETITIONER'S,
CONDITION FOR WHICH SHE RECEIVED TREATMENT WAS PSYCHIATRIC IN
NATURE, AND/OR (b) THE CONDITION WAS NOT ACUTE, LIFE THREATENING
OR A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE.
The Petitioner, Cynthia Driver, is a 37 year old female who was admitted to McKay-Dee
Hospital on January 29,2000, as the result of a suicide attempt. On that date she states that she
ingested 90 tablets of Lithium, 300 milligrams; 15 allergy tablets and an unspecified amount of
alcohol. She claims this attempt was prompted by her receiving notice that her claim for social
security disability benefits had been denied. She claims that she had prior suicide attempts, the
earliest at age 17. She has been treated for mental illness off and on since September, 1998. She
was discharged on January 31, 2000.
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While at the hospital she was observed, medicated and given an EKG. The principal
diagnosis was " Bipolar Affective Disorder NOS. Currently appears mixed with depression and
maniac (sic) symptomatology. Probable obsessive compulsive disorder. Panic disorder with
agoraphobia. Dysthymic disorder." She further complained of low back pain and stress.
On April 21, 2000, a Notice of Denial was sent to the Petitioner. The Notice of Denial
specified as reasons for denial (a) UMAP does not cover psychiatric conditions or treatment, (b)
Not within scope of service - UMAP coverage is limited to conditions that are acute, life
threatening or infectious and (c) Law enforcement involvement. UMAP will not authorize
payment for any medical or surgical need which was provided to a person who was in the
custody of a law enforcement officer, a jail or correctional facility at the time the service was
rendered. At the pre-hearing reason (c) was determined not to be valid and was withdrawn by
the Department of Health UMAP Program Manager. A timely Request for Hearing was filed,
dated May 5, 2000, and received by the Utah Department of Health. A pre-hearing was held July
12, 2000, and a formal hearing was requested at that time.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner is a 37 year old female who has suffered with psychological problems and
suicide ideology since she was 17.
2. Petitioner had been denied social security disability benefits and this prompted the
January 29, 2000, suicide attempt.
3. Petitioner had been approved for UMAP coverage effective October 1, 1998, and said
coverage was effective on the date she sought treatment at McKay-Dee Hospital.
4. That on April 29,2000, she was admitted to McKay-Dee Hospital as the result of a
suicide attempt in which she overdosed on 90 Lithium tablets, 15 allergy tablets and an
unspecified amount of alcohol.
5. The principal diagnosis determined by her treating physician was bipolar affective
disorder, a psychiatric condition.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The medical agency properly denied payment for services because the requested
services were for a psychiatric condition and were, therefore, a non-covered service as
determined by Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1-5 (1) (b) and Rule R420-1-6 (1) (c).
2. The medical agency properly denied payment for services because the UMAP
program specifically excludes services for mental illness or disorder as specified in Utah
Administrative Rule R420-1 -6 (1) (c).
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REASONS FOR HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION
The undisputed facts are that the Petitioner sought medical assistance from the McKayDee Hospital on January 29,2000, as the result of a suicide attempt. The principal diagnosis
specified in the discharge summary is bipolar affective disorder, a psychiatric condition. Utah
Administrative Code Rule R420-1-5 (3) states as follows:
(3) For all UMAP covered services, the principal diagnosis at discharge from the hospital
is the reason for care. UMAP may not consider the other diagnoses when determining
whether the service is covered by UMAP. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1 -5 outlines the scope of services covered by
UMAP. It states in part as follows:
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is limited to treatment of conditions that
meet one or more of the following criteria, unless elsewhere excluded:
(a) an acute condition characterized by a rapid onset requiring prompt medical
attention. UMAP shall consider a condition to be not acute once it is medically
established to have been in existence for four months or more, regardless of when
the client began experiencing symptoms. Recurring conditions are not acute;
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not psychiatric: (Emphasis added.)
(c) a communicable disease that poses a health risk to the general public
While it is the position of the Petitioner that she comes within the coverage of the UMAP
program because her condition was life threatening at the time she entered the hospital, it is clear
from the provisions of R420-1-5 (1) (b) that even if the condition was life threatening it was a
psychiatric condition that is specifically excluded.
Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1-6 deals with those services that are specifically
excluded under the UMAP program. It reads in part as follows:
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP include:
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alcohol addiction

(Emphasis

added.)
(2) Services that are not covered by UMAP include:
(e) psychiatry, or any service provided while (s)he is in a psychiatric facility,
wing, ward or bed
Clearly, from the above language, the treatment of any metal illness or disorder or and
service provided while being treated for such an illness is not covered under the UMAP program
and Petitioner is not entitled to have these expenses paid by UMAP.
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Counsel for the Petitioner argues that even if the hospital stay itself were not covered,
UMAP should pay the minimal set triage fee for emergency transportation, emergency room
physicians and emergency room facility charges as provided in R420-1-5 (3) (a). Sadly, Counsel
has misread the Rule. In order for the UMAP program to cover such charges the following
criteria must be met:
1. Those charges must be for services that do not result in an inpatient admission, and,
2. The admission diagnosis must be for a UMAP covered medical condition, but the
principal diagnosis at discharge is psychiatric. (Emphasis added.)
In the Petitioner's case, the services did result in an inpatient admission, and no evidence
was adduced at the hearing to indicate that the admission diagnosis was for any UMAP covered
service. Thus Counsel's argument must fail.

RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION
UMAP's decision to deny payment for services rendered by McKay-Dee Hospital in the
above matter is AFFIRMED. No further agency action is necessary.
RIGHT TO REVIEW
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of
Health, Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the Recommended Decision
and a Final Agency Action, which represents the results of that review, will be released
simultaneously by the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing.
Dated this

7

day of September, 2000.

^AM^ERTUS JA
/HEARING OFFIC
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Case #00-172-42
EXHIBITS

The following documents were admitted into evidence:
Petitioner's Exhibit "1", Statement from Dr. David R. King, M.D.
Respondent's Exhibit "A", Rules 420-1-5 and 6.
Respondent's Exhibit "B", Discharge summary for Petitioner's visit to McKay Dee Hospital on
January 29,2000.
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No: 00-172-42
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
7
day of October 2000,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINAL AGENCY ORDER AND RECOMMENDED DECISION, to the
following parties:
POSTAGE PREPAID
MICHAEL CHRISTIANSEN
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
893 24TH STREET, SUITE 300
OGDEN,UTAH 84401
CYNTHIA DRIVER
2530 GRAMERCY #2
OGDEN,UTAH 84401

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MAIL
DAVID MCKNIGHT, LEGAL COUNSEL
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
CLEVE EVANS, PROGRAM MANAGER
HEALTH CLINICS OF UTAH/UMAP
150 E CENTER ST, SUITE 1100
PROVO,UTAH 84606
CECELIA RICHENS
HEALTH CLINICS OF UTAH/UMAP
230E2121S
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115
MICHAEL DEILY, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

CHRIS SMITH
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

I /\A
*
1

893 24th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401
Phone/Fax (801) 394-9431
Toll Free 1 -800-662-2538

October 19, 2000

Michael Deilly
Director
Division of Health Care Financing
Utah Department of Health
P.O. Box 143101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-3101
Re:

\'

\cm
*\<

<*>
<> ?vc-

Cynthia Driver v. Utah DOH, DHCF; Case N o . 00-172-42

Dear Mr. Deilly:
This is to request review of the undated final agency order in
this case, which w a s mailed from your office on October 4, 2000.
For the following reasons, the decision should be reconsidered and
a decision made that the services are covered by UMAP.
While the principal diagnosis determined by the emergency room
physician was bipolar affective disorder, that is not the condition
for which services were provided. M s . Driver was taken to McKay
Dee Hospital because of an attempted suicide. A t the emergency
room, the treatment provided was not for bipolar disorder but for
a life-threatening
condition—attempted
suicide.
This is
significantly different from the hypothetical case of a UMAP
patient w h o goes to a psychiatrist and is treated for bipolar
disorder with medication and psychotherapy. To treat the cases the
same is illogical and inappropriate.
Further, M s . Driver is being discriminated against, simply
because of the nature of her condition.
M r . Cleve Evans, who
testified at the hearing, admitted that a claimant admitted to an
emergency room with apparent cardiac symptoms would be covered,
even though the svmptoms might have been caused by a panic
disorder, a type of mental impairment. There is no rational basis
alt Lake City
7. 4th 5., 2nd Fir.
328-8891
800-662-4245
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for distinguishing such a case from what happened in Ms. Driver's
case. Refusal to cover Ms. Driver represents a denial of equal
protection under both the Utah and United States constitutions.
Ms. Driver.
I recognize that limited funds in the UMAP budget have forced
severe restriction of services.
However, even within those
limitations, people must be treated fairly. It is wrong to exalt
form over substance by classifying Ms. Driver's case as one
involving a psychiatric condition and, therefore, ineligible. The
Constitution was adopted to prevent such unfairness and I encourage
you to reconsider this unfortunate decision.
Very truly yours,

fichael E. Bulson
Attorney at Law
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CYNTHIA DRIVER,
Petitioner,

;
])
)

DENIAL OF REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

])
;
]

Case No. 00-172-42

The petitioner's request for reconsideration has been reviewed pursuant to 63-46b-l 3
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION
The petitioner's request for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION
As explained in the recommended decision, UMAP will not cover treatment of a patient
when the principal diagnosis is psychiatric or mental illness. It does not matter whether there
were other diagnoses along with the principal diagnosis. Petitioner does not allege any newfacts, but rather, reasserts what Petitioner already argued during the hearing, that the diagnosis
and treatment for the emergency medical condition resulting from the suicide attempt should be
distinguished from the principal psychiatric diagnosis and treatment Petitioner received while at
the hospital. A final agency decision has been appropriately made on this issue. Reasserting it
again is not grounds for granting a reconsideration.
Petitioner also asserts as grounds for reconsideration, that UMAP violates constitutional
equal protection principles because UMAP witness Cleve Evans stated that UMAP would cover
emergency cardiac symptoms caused by a panic disorder, yet, will not cover the treatment of
Petitioner's suicide attempt resulting from a bi-polar condition. This brief statement does not
signify that UMAP has equal protection problems when read in the context of UMAP
requirements. As discussed in the final agency order, UMAP requires that the principal diagnosis
will determine whether or not UMAP covers hospital care. If a panic disorder precipitates
cardiac symptoms and the principal diagnosis is a medical condition such as an underlying heart
problem or cardiac arrest, it would be covered by UMAP. If a panic disorder creates cardiac
symptoms that require some medical attention, such as medication to alleviate the symptoms, yet
the principal diagnoses and treatment ends up being a psychiatric condition, the treatment would
not be covered by UMAP. In the present case, the principal diagnosis of Petitioner's suicide
attempt was her underlying problem with her bi-polar psychiatric condition. Although, the
emergency room resolved the emergency medical condition resulting from Petitioner's bi-polar
induced actions, the primary problem and focus was the Petitioner's psychiatric condition. Thus,
during the Petitioner's 2 to 3 day stay in the hospital, the hospital chiefly addressed Petitioner's
principal bi-polar psychiatric condition. The fact there are at times consequences to psychiatric
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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conditions that require emergency care, does not override the principal diagnosis of the
psychiatric condition. Petitioner's assertion of an equal protection issue based on a brief and
general statement of a UMAP witness, does not create an equal protection issue. Especially,
when Petitioner ignores UMAP's principal diagnoses requirements as explained in the final
agency order. Accordingly, reconsideration is not warranted here.
Finally, Petitioner commented on recent funding cuts to UMAP and seems to imply that
budgetary constraints may have played a roll in the decision to deny Petitioner coverage for her
hospital treatment. This case involved both the treatment of a medical condition and a
psychiatric condition. The hospital records indicate that the principal diagnosis and treatment of
Petitioner was for her psychiatric condition. Although, Petitioner presented herself to the
hospital because of putting herself into a life threatening condition, the hospital quickly stabilized
the emergency medical condition and then focused on what the hospital noted as the principal
condition, the Petitioner's psychiatric problems. As determined in the final order, UMAP denied
coverage based on the hospital records indicating a principal psychiatric condition. UMAP has
always been a program that is very limited in its scope of coverage. Speculating and implying
that UMAP inappropriately denied Petitioner coverage based on budgetary concerns does not
warrant reconsideration of this matter.
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within
thirty days of the issuance of this Response to Request for Reconsideration. The petition shall be
served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon
which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit shall
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal this Response to Request for Reconsideration.
A copy of this Response to Request for Reconsideration shall be sent to the petitioner or
his/her representative at the last known address by certified mail, return receipt requested.
DATED this J^f&y

of November, 2000.

-Michael J. DeiW, Dire^or
Division of Health Gare Financing
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies
and standards.
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be known as the Utah Medical Assistance
Program, for low income persons who are not eligible under
the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act.
(2) Persons in the custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses,
and other nonmedical government institutions are not eligible
for services provided under this section.
(3) The department shah develop standards and administer
policies relating to eligibility requirements, consistent with
Subsection 26-18-3(6), for participation in the program, and
for payment of medical claims for eligible persons.
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before
assistance is rendered the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the spouse, father, mother, and adult
child r e n of the person making application.
(5) The department shall determine what medically necess ary care or services are covered under the program, including
(Juration of care, and methcd of payment, which may be
partial or in full.
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for
tnedical, hospital, or other medical expenditures or medical
services to otherwise eligible persons where the purpose of the
assistance is for the performance of an abortion, unless the life
of the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not
performed.
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the
provisions of this section.
1999
26-18-11. Rural hospitals.
{V For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a
hospital located outside of a standard metropolitan statistical
area, as designated by the United States Bureau of the
| Census.
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah
Medical Assistance Program, the Division of Health Care
Financing shall not discriminate among rural hospitals on the
basis of size.
1988
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R420-1. Utah Medical Assistance Program.
R42 0-1-1. Introduction and Authority.
R420-1-2. Definitions.
R420-1-3. Client Eligibility Requirements.
R420-1-4. Program Access Requirements.
R420-1-5. Service Coverage.
R420-1-6. Limitations and Excluded Services.
R420-1-7. FormMI-706.
R420-1-8. Claims.
R420-1-9. Reimbursement.
R420-1-10. Third Party Liability.
R420-1-11. Client Rights and Responsibilities.
R420-1-1. Introduction and Authority.
(1) The Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP;
is designed to provide medically necessary care to low
income clients who are not eligible for Medicaid or
Medicare.
(2) This rule is authorized under Section 26-18-10.
R420-1-2. Definitions.
Terms used in this rule are defined in R414-1-1.
except that "client'' shall have the meaning defined
below. In addition:
(1) "Chronic condition" means a condition characterized by its long duration or recurrence.
(2) "Client" means a person who has completed a
current form MI-13 and been approved for UMAP
eligibility.
(3) "Crime" means any felony, misdemeanor, or
infraction, of which an individual is eventually convicted, pleads guilty or no contest, or enters into a
diversion agreement as outlined in sections 77-2-5
through -9.
(4) ''Emergency service" means a medical service
performed to treat a condition for which the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in death or permanent disability to
the client. Immediate medical attention is treatment
given within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms or
within 24 hours of diagnosis.
(5) "Emergency transportation*' means an air ur
ground ambulance required to transport a client in
need of an emergency service. This does not include
any transportation in which a client could have been
safely transported by any other method of transportation.
(6) "In custody" means being detained or held under
guard by law enforcement personnel at the scene of a
crime or in a detention facility, until unconditionally
released, or released on probation or parole. The
department shall consider a resident of a jail, correctional facility, or half-way house to be in custody.
(7) "Life threatening condition" means a medical
condition which, if not immediately treated, poses an
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imminent danger to life or will result in permanent
disability. Disability is the limiting loss or absence of
the capacity to perform activities of daily living or
occupational demands. Permanent disability occurs
when the degree of loss of this capacity becomes static
or well-stabilized, and is not likely to improve despite
continuing medical or rehabilitative measures.
(8) "Medically indigent" is abbreviated "MF, which
is a prefix for UMAP form numbers.
(a) MI-13 is a UMAP form that explains to clients
the rights and responsibilities they have as UMAP
clients. A MI-13 form is current from the time it is
completed until there is a break in eligibility of more
than six consecutive months.
(b) MI-706 is a UMAP form entitled "UMAP Reimbursement Agreement" that authorizes reimbursement for a medical service.
(9) "Medically necessary" means reasonably calculated to prevent, diagnose, or cure conditions that
endanger life, cause suffering and pain, cause physical deformity or malfunction, or threaten to cause a
handicap, and there is no other equally effective
course of treatment available or suitable for the client
requesting the service that is more conservative or
less costly.
(10) "Principal diagnosis at discharge" means the
main medical problem, based on the best information
available for review by UMAP.
R420-1-3. Client Eligibility Requirements.
(1) To be eligible for UMAP services, clients shall
meet income and asset limits and other eligibility
requirements found in the Medical Assistance
Manual, Volume III F, which is incorporated by reference. Manuals can be viewed at the local Office of
Family Support, or at the UMAP administrative office
located at 288 N. 1460 W., Salt Lake City, Utah.
(2) Eligibility for UMAP services is determined at
an Office of Family Support district office.
(3) Before a client can receive services from UMAP,
he must have a specific medical need that is within
the UMAP scope of services and meets all other
UMAP criteria.
R420-1-4. Program Access Requirements.
(1) UMAP has three medical clinics. Each clinic has
on its staff a physician, or a physician assistant or
nurse practitioner working under the supervision of a
physician. For clients who reside in Salt Lake, Weber,
Morgan, and Utah counties, if the physician or supervising physician determines it appropriate, the physician, physician assistant, or nurse practitioner shall
evaluate and treat the client.
(2) The clinic shall refer the client outside of the
clinic only for treatment of covered conditions that
cannot be treated in the clinic. The supervising physician shall decide the conditions that can be treated
at the clinic. The clinic manager shall decide the
services that are covered under UMAP.
(3) Clients residing in all other counties may contact
the nearest Office of Family Support for a form MI706. This office may then refer the client to a private
physician who is willing to treat the client within the
guidelines of UMAP criteria.
R420-1-5. Service Coverage.
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is limited
to treatment of conditions that meet one or more of the
following criteria, unless elsewhere excluded: •
(a) an acute condition characterized by a rapid onset
requiring prompt medical attention. UMAP shall consider a condition to be not acute'once it is medically

established to have been in existence for four months <
or more, regardless of when the client began experi-^1
encing symptoms. Recurring conditions are not acute;'*!
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not psychiat-* s t ]
ric;
^ksrl
(c) a communicable disease that poses a health risk
to the general public;
(d) a condition that will result in irreversible blind- „*& j
ness if left untreated, blindness meaning no better,*^ 1
than 20/200 visual acuity in the better eye after *~£correction.
$
(e) cataracts, if the correction is no better than 20/60 „%*
visual acuity in the better eye.
t?
(f) eyeglasses for a client in a work or training £
program if the client cannot participate in the work or -f>
training without the eyeglasses, or for a diabetic client *£
who cannot see well enough to administer his own 4
medication.
(2) UMAP may cover the following medical services:
(a) outpatient hospital services;
;
(b) physician services;
(c) midwife and birthing center services;
$
(d) radiology and lab services;
}
(e) emergency transportation services for both air %
u
and ground;
j|
(f) dental services;
2
(g) pharmacy services;
i
(h) rural health services;
3
(i) home health services for I.V. antibiotics.
(3) For all UMAP covered services, the principal J
diagnosis at discharge from the hospital is the reason <^
for the care. UMAP may not consider the other diag- ^
noses when determining whether the service is cov- ^
ered by UMAP.
jj
(a) UMAP shall pay a minimal set triage fee for ,
emergency transportation, emergency room physi- 3
cians, and emergency room facility charges for ser- j
vices that do not result in an inpatient admission, if 'i
the admission diagnosis is a UMAP covered medical ^
condition, but the principal diagnosis at discharge is j
psychiatric.
(b) The minimal set triage fee shall constitute
payment for the entire service. A notation on the form
MI-706 advises the provider that he received authori- 1
zation for only the minimal set triage fee.
j
(4) A provider or a client may resolve questions
about coverage of a specific condition or service by
contacting the appropriate UMAP clinic in Salt Lake,
Morgan, Weber, or Utah counties, or the Office of
Family Support for all other counties, depending upon
where the client lives.
R420-1-6. Limitations and Excluded Services.
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP include:
(a) chronic pain, back pain, knee pain, joint pain,
from recurring or chronic conditions;
(b) hernias that are not strangulated or incarcerated, carpal tunnel syndrome, bunions, nasal polyps;
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alcohol addiction;
(d) obesity, hormonal imbalance, bulimia, anorexia
nervosa;
(e) long-standing arthritis, except treatment of
acute flare-ups is a covered service;
(f) allergies, cataracts, temporomandibular joint
dysfunction, premenstrual syndrome, aseptic (avascular) necrosis;
(g)'rhinitis, 24-hour gastritis, common cold, any „
condition for which there is no accepted medical
therapy;
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« (h) a condition that is disabling, but does not meet provided if vthe service is -within /UMAP scope of
services, meets all other UMAP criteria, and: •"
the mteria;iisted in"R420-l:5(l); -r:.. «^, >
(a) is for follow-up services for a surgery that UMAP
(i) a condition !that is not ^covered by the -Utah
has authorized.=Follow-up services .are ibr normal,
M^caid program;'''i-^;^ i i ' & .
«- ; .;- -l.w'-'
/-' ' V ^ J ^ ^ S ^ ^ P ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ 6 ^ 1 1 1 8 6 . 0 ^ a s n o w skiing or uncomplicated post-surgery hospitalization, office fol?
^;t^sno^^
a<n?;: Iw/i'/r- , V-.. -'• V1:. ^ low-ups;or other services provided within six weeks of
^ U t ^ i ) a ^ndition caused ytrhen the client was commit- the surgery.and directly areiateH t o ^ e surgery; ^or:^
.
^ ^ n ^ O T m ^ ^ A J ^ s h a U aUow^elclient topresent :.$^);fe fOTian s m & g e n ^ i e m
• ' Hfoimatibnlo prove that involvement in the alleged I ^(c) is ibr Services^that were" pfjowdea hefore^UMAP .- .•
. crime tdid moi Jt cause lor ^contribute ?to :<his ^medical approved thechentfor.eli^^ty/i^^.before the chent
a'curreht form "MI-13.-The client jnust
cbndltioif.^rhe^..clientJmust ^submit this information -had completed
4
nolater than one year after
withlnT60 iiays^f ihe'date of the denial; . ; r-r;- *• — ,:Tequest £he form MI-706
1
the
date
t)f
service,
or
_ihe"iate
:
v UM^rapprwedliis'
:4d)'iii 'Condition caused when the client was being
etigibility,1 whicheverplater. The. cUenlt shall provide
arrested; ^ - ^ y ^ ^
•
. any documentation that UMAP requires, orthe chent
, (m) a condition caused when the chent was injured wants considered, to make scope^df-seryice decisions.
by a law enforcement officer; *
(2) A chent must present the form;MI:706 to the
*;
- ••• (n) a ^condition 'caused -when ^the chent >was in
provider before receiving any service, except for situ^
custody/
'/••', ations in which there is no UMAP requirement for the
C"*
T (2) Services that are not covered by UMAP include:
chent to obtain the form MI-706 prior to receiving the
?'--;
(a) cosmetic surgery;
service. If a chent presents a form MI-706 to a
*&
• (b) tympanoplasties; „
provider iefore .receiving a service, and the provider
jjk.v
(c) hysterectomies and pelvic surgery, except when accepts the form MI-706, the provider may not hold
&
there is a reasonable suspicion of a life threatening the client financially liable for the service that was
fcv * condition;
„, c
provided, whether or not UMAP reimburses the pros
(d) back surgeries, knee surgeries, joint surgeries, vider. If a chent does not present a form MI-706 to a
* H,
for recurring or chronic conditions;
provider, or if the provider does not accept the form
M; • ^eX P s v c ^ ? t ^ P ^ ^ y fif^P?1L provided to a client MI-706, the, provider may hold the client financially
v
ffe
while he is in a psychiatric'fadlity^Wing, ward, or bed; liable for the service and treat the "chent as a "selfy.
(f) diagnostic work, unless a covered condition is pay" patient. Any time a provider receives a form
MI-706, and bills UMAP using the MI-706 number,
suspected;- (g) speech pathology, audiology (except to rule out a UMAP shall consider that the provider has accepted
brain tumor), audiometry (except to rule out a brain the form MI-706.
stem lesion);
(3) After a client has completed a current form
(h) medical supplies, except syringes, lancets, test MI-13 and is approved for UMAP eligibility, he must
strips for diabetics, and ostomy supplies;
present a form MI-706 to the provider for all non. (i) medical equipment, except an oxygen concentra- emergency services before the services are provided.
tor if required 24 hours a day;
(j) prosthetic devices, except once when the need for R420-1-8. Claims.
(1) A provider shall submit a claim for UMAP
the device arises from any authorized surgery;
(k) care in a long-term care facility, physical services in the same way he submits a bill for Utah
therapy, rehabilitative services, chiropractic services; Medicaid services, except the provider must submit a
form MI-706 number for UMAP services. If UMAP has
(1) dental work (except for exam, x-ray, and extrac- authorized a service, a form MI-706 number will be
tion of infected teeth), dentures;
printed on top of the form MI-706. The provider shall
(m) sterilization (tubal ligation, vasectomy, etc.), enter this number in the appropriate box on the
abortion (unless the life of the mother would be invoice. The provider shall submit the claim no later
endangered if an abortion were not performed), birth than 12 months after the date of service or six months
control;
after the form MI-706 was issued, whichever is later.
(n) elective surgery, organ transplants;
(2) If a provider timely submits a claim and the
(0) liver biopsy or use of Interferon when being claim is denied because there is no form MI-706, the
prescribed for treatment of Hepatitis C;
provider may resubmit the claim to UMAP no later
(p) treatment in a pain clinic;
than one year after the date of service or two months
(q) non-emergency use of an emergency room or after the date of denial, whichever is later. The proemergency transportation;
vider shall include with the resubmitted claim a copy
(r) a service that is not covered by the Utah Medic- of the remittance advice showing the denial, and
aid program;
documentation explaining the nature of the medical
(s) a service if the department determines that care provided.
there is or was an effective less-costly alternative;
(t) a service provided to treat a medical condition, if R420-1-9. Reimbursement.
UMAP shall only reimburse Utah Medicaid providthe need for treatment arose while the client was in
ers who accept payment from UMAP as payment in
custody;
(u) a service for a condition that is a complication of, full for the service provided. UMAP adopts the Utah
or a follow-up service for, a non-covered UMAP ser- Medicaid reimbursement policies and payment rates
vice. The only exception would be if the service was for services covered by UMAP. Because inpatient
. hospital services are not a benefit of UMAP, UMAP
not covered as a result of lack of client eligibility.
shall not reimburse for these services. .
.
R420-1-7. Form MI-706^: C
^ J
(1) UMAP may only pay for a service authorized on R420-1-10. Thircl Party Liability.
: r
a form MI-706. Generally, the chent must obtain the
(1) UMAP may not reimburse for covered medical
form MI-706 before the service is provided. The chent services if payment for the service can be, or could
may obtain the form .-MI-706 after^the 'service is ; have been, obtainedfromother third-party sources. If
I

£
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partial payment is made by a third-party payor, <
UMAP shall pay the difference up to the limits set by
Medicaid.
^ :
»
(2) Clients and providers shall disclose potentially !
liable third parties. When any other coverage is avail- !
able (such as treatment at the Veterans Administra- \
tion Hospital), the UMAP clinic or provider shall refer
the client there for treatment, and UMAP may not
authorize payment for those services.
R420-1-11. Client Rights and Responsibilities.
(1) The client shall make an appointment to see
office or clinic staff.
(2) If a client misses an appointment in a UMAP
clinic, the client shall have either of two options
regarding future appointments. The client can come
in as a walk-in and wait to be seen on a first-comefirst-served basis after clients who have appointments, or the client can make a co-payment before
being seen at his next appointment. The co-payment
is $1 for missing one appointment, $2 for missing two
consecutive appointments, and $3 for missing three
consecutive appointments. If the client misses more
than three consecutive appointments, the client must
come in as a walk-in and wait to be seen on a
first-come-first-served basis after clients who have
appointments. Clients may cancel UMAP clinic ap- :
pointments up to two hours before the appointment
with no penalty.
(3) If a client misses an appointment with a private
provider, the client shall make a $5 co-payment to
UMAP for each of the client's next two appointments
with private providers before the client will be given a
form MI-706 for these appointments. If the client
keeps these appointments, UMAP will refund the $5
as soon as the client returns to UMAP and UMAP
verifies that the client kept the appointment. UMAP
shall consider appointments with private providers to
be missed if the client cancels the appointment less
than 24 hours before the appointment.
V, (4) UMAP may deny services to a client who verbally or physically abuses a member of the UMAP
staffs'.;'

-.. -':•

...
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.
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(5) UMAP shall send a Notice of Denial to a client
who is denied coverage for a requested medical treatment. If a client or a provider is aggrieved by any
action or,; inaction of the department, the person
aggrieved may request a hearing in accordance with
R410-14. A provider does not have standing to contest
issues'. concerning scope of services or the client's
eligibility status.
'
..
' V (6) The' client shall be responsible for making a
timely request for a form MI-706. If he fails to obtain
the form MI-706, the client shall be liable for any costs
incurred." ^j'."\:y''j, .y}'-AV*V/;'.-.',:V' ~;,Y ; "•> "•".'

;

•/• References: 26-1-5; 26-18-10. T„ -.,
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